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Managing Operator Mental Workload with
Standards Based Decision Support1
Dr. Maurice J. Wilkins
Yokogawa UK Ltd, Stuart Road, Manor Park, Runcorn, Cheshire, WA7 1TR,
United Kingdom
maurice.wilkins@uk.yokogawa.com

Abstract. There have been several well publicized incidents over the past few
years in refinery and petrochemical facilities. Incident reports from amongst
others, the Chemical Safety Board and papers from ARC and Marsh McLennan
Insurance Company show that many of these incidents can be attributed to
operational errors. On closer examination of possible actions during a crisis,
such as mistakes due to confusion and time taken to understand the value of
information being presented, it begs the question - “Are Machines Better than
Humans in a Crisis”. In fact, could technology provide better safety and
business benefits? On November 4th 2010, Qantas Airlines flight 32, an Airbus
A380, took off from Singapore to Sydney en route from London Heathrow. At
the time, the A380 was the world’s largest and most technically advanced
airliner. Not long after take-off over Indonesia one of the engines exploded. The
incident report said that had there not been five experienced pilots on board that
day, the plane could have crashed. Thankfully they saved the aircraft which
landed back in Singapore. The conclusion was that the balance of advanced
technology and human thinking saved the day. In essence, in a stressful
situation both humans and machines have a role to play.
Keywords: Operator Mental Workload, Decision Support, Standards, Alarm
Management, Procedure Management, Human Machine Interface Management

1 Introduction
This paper aims to show how standards can help to alleviate operator mental
workload in industrial applications during times of stress, especially during abnormal
operations. It presents possible areas for future research.
Operator error has been put forward as one of the causes of many major incidents
in the recent past, but incident reports show that this is often the result of bad
procedures, lack of training and the lack of enough resources in times of abnormal
operations. It can be shown that with the right skills and tools, a good operator can
help to avoid these situations. Probably the most advanced decision support systems
may be found in the aircraft industry, but even these can go wrong sometimes and it
comes back to the skills and training of humans to avoid potential disasters. In this
1
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paper some of these incidents will be examined and a standards-based approach
presented that may provide help in future situations.
During normal operation, processes run mostly untouched by operators, especially
in continuous plants. But in an incident, there is too much information, which
increases operator mental workload and so they can become confused and make
mistakes. Humans are not designed to cope with masses of information, especially
when they are under stress. Start-ups and shutdowns of process units are considered to
be ‘normal’ operations, along with grade changes and other transitions, however these
are amongst the more error prone operations that again increase the mental workload
of operators.

2 Case Study: Texaco Refinery, Milford Haven 1994
A clear example of extreme operator mental overload happened on Sunday 24 July
1994, when a lightning strike started a fire on the crude distillation unit (CDU), which
eventually led to an explosion on the fluid catalytic cracking unit (FCCU). Although
the media put the blame on the lightning strike, the incident report [2] stated that
“these events, though significant in initiating a plant upset, were not the cause of the
release and explosion that occurred five hours later. These consequences resulted
from subsequent failures to manage the plant upset safely”. Luckily, although there
were some serious injuries, no one was killed.
Amongst many other things, the report cited bad alarm management, bad display
design and a failure to follow procedures. For example, it stated “From the limited
amount of alarm information relevant to the event which was preserved from just one
of the journals, it was seen that in the last 10.7 minutes before the explosion the two
operators had to recognise, acknowledge and take appropriate action on 275 alarms.
At times during the morning operators were doing nothing but acknowledging
alarms”. It went on to say that the chances of operators restoring control manually
were reduced as the incident progressed due to them being overloaded by a “barrage
of alarms”. There were 2040 alarms configured and of those in the distributed control
system (DCS) 87% were high priority. During the incident, the operators had to cope
with alarms coming in a rate of one every 2-3 seconds, which resulted in many being
cancelled due to their nuisance. There was no evidence that a vital high level alarm on
the flare drum what went off 25 minutes before the explosion was ever seen.
In addition the report indicated that the FCCU graphics were not designed in a way
to help the operators to control the process. There were limited amounts of process
data and colour was not used in a way to highlight important data. It also said that
there was information on the graphics, such as the structure of plant items, which had
no relevance to plant operation and shouldn’t have been there. Finally, several
procedures had fallen into disuse from lack of practice and documenting them. I will
discuss later how standards and better design could maybe have helped in this
incident.

3 Managing Mental Workload in a ‘Life or Death’ Incident
Having several very skilled “operators” probably saved Qantas flight 32 on November
4th, 2010. The flight operated by an A380 Airbus – the largest and most technically
advanced passenger aircraft in the world at the time had left Singapore for Sydney,
when over Indonesia one of the engines blew apart; figures 2 and 3 show the extent of
the damage. In fact, the damage to the wing shown in figure 3 rendered almost the
entire wing controls inoperable.

Fig. 2. Engine Damage

Fig. 3. Damage To Wing

The pilots were inundated with messages – 54 came in to alert them of system
failures or impending failures but only 10 could fit onto the screen. The pilots
watched as screens full of messages came in. Luckily on that flight there were five
experienced pilots including three captains who were on “check” flights. Even with
that much experience on board it took 50 minutes for the pilots to work through the
messages and prioritize them to find the status of the plane. The incident report said
that without those pilots it’s possible the flight would not have made it. In fact, the
‘airmanship’ of the pilots saved the plane. If the pilots had followed ALL the advice
of the flight systems the plane would have crashed. The most senior pilot told the
others to read the messages but ‘feel’ the plane. They managed to land the plane with
only one of its four engines in full working order.
Many pilots are also chosen due to their ability to handle stressful situations calmly
and they go through extensive mental workload training on simulators, covering every
kind of incident that could happen. In fact on the ‘Miracle on the Hudson’ US
Airways flight 1549, which landed safely on the Hudson after a bird strike on January
15th, 2009, none of the crew had ever met each other, but their calmness and following
procedures to the letter, saved the plane and many lives.

4 Finding a Way to Help Operators under Mental Stress
From the Qantas and US Airways incidents, it’s clear that humans and machines have
a role to play in crisis situations. On the one hand, systems can help and also the
person’s individual character matter, but we may ask if it would be possible to take

the human out of the equation. The theoretical answer to that is yes. It is possible to
run a process plant without operators and to fly a plane without pilots but would
anyone fly on such an aircraft?
Can we use machines to guide humans and the deductive power of humans (given
a logical number of options) to make the correct decision? Mary L. Cummings,
Director of the Humans and Automation Laboratory (HAL), at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) and a former Navy F-18 pilot, who is doing research
into human-automated path planning optimization and decision support has said [3]
“Humans are doing a pretty good job, but they do it even better with the assistance of
algorithms” and “This research is really showing the power of how, when algorithms
work with humans, the whole system performs better.” Hence, letting computers
analyse masses of information generated during an incident and giving the operator
options as to how to alleviate the incident, may help to manage the mental workload.
Humans have emotions and get stressed. There is no better example of this
happening than in a crisis, as shown above in section 2. Some humans are able to
handle crises in a very calm way, as shown by historical heroic efforts in war and
peace, but the majority tends either to try to do everything, panic or just switch off. So
when even the best operator is faced with many alarms coming in at the same time
and other things happening around him, he will likely try to look at as many as he can
and work out a scenario and possible solution, but that may be too late. It would be
much better if the system provided him with options and guidance – or decision
support.

5 Standards Based Decision Support Helping Mental Workload
Decisions are made by assessing the problem, collecting and verifying information,
identify alternatives, anticipating consequences of possible decisions and then making
a choice using sound and logical judgment based on available information.
Few humans in a crisis are able to do this without help. Either they find it difficult
to manage the situation to give them time to gather enough information to make a
sound decision or they just run out of time trying to make the decision. With decision
support and guidance this task becomes more manageable.
In key areas such as human machine interface design, alarm management and
procedure management basic decision support may be developed. In support of this,
industry standards are either available or being developed. For now, I am going to
concentrate on The International Society for Automation (ISA) and The American
National Standards Institute (ANSI), globally recognized standards development
organizations, which are developing standards based on the three areas mentioned
above and they are providing or will provide a good basis for decision support:
•
ANSI/ISA-18.2-2009 – Management of Alarm Systems for the Process
Industries
•
ANSI/ISA-101.01-2015 – Human Machine Interfaces for Process Automation
Systems
•
ISA–TR106.01 – Technical Report: Procedure Automation for Continuous
Process Operations – Models and Terminology

•

ISA–dTR106.02 Working Draft 16 – Technical Report: Procedure Automation
for Continuous Process Operations – Work Processes
ANSI/ISA-18.2, which has been a standard since 2009, provides requirements and
recommendations for the activities of the alarm management lifecycle. The lifecycle
stages include philosophy, identification, rationalization, detail design,
implementation, operation, maintenance, monitoring & assessment, management of
change, and audit. Using this standard should prevent incidents like the one at Texaco
Milford Haven. Alarms are rationalized and prioritized so that high priority alarms
either trigger an action or are responded to urgently.
ANSI/ISA101.01 is directed at those responsible for designing, implementing,
using, and/or managing human-machine interfaces (HMI) in manufacturing
applications. The standard itself has internal standards aimed at producing a HMI
philosophy, HMI style guide and HMI toolkit, all of which should lead to a design
that is helpful to the operator.
The ISA106 committee has produced one technical report defining models and
terminology and is close to releasing a second on work processes, before starting the
process of developing a standard. The standard helps to define which procedures
should be automated and under what circumstances.
When combined together these three standards offer a powerful tool to provide
decision support in times of normal and abnormal operations. In a March 2017
interview [4] with Bonnie Ramey of DuPont, Greg MacMillan and Stan Reiner of
Control magazine discuss how the tight integration between ISA18.2 and ISA101 can
aid the safe operation of processes.

6 Standards Working in Harmony for Decision Support
If configured correctly, well planned alarms could trigger procedures in many
abnormal situations and a well-designed human machine interface could bring a
developing incident to the attention of the operator in a timely manner, as shown
below in Figure 4; this is called Advanced Decision Support (ADS) [5].

Fig. 4. Standards Based Decision Support

Alarm management should limit alarms to what the operator has time and ability to
handle by developing an alarm philosophy and rationalization program. The alarms
should then be continuously monitored and optimized. In that was we can ensure the
right alarms are detected and then either the operator or the system can take action.
With good HMI management, the operator displays are designed based on operator
tasks, incorporate human factors such as colour, layout and navigation. They should
provide situation awareness through trends and profiles and provide clear indications
of items that need attention.
Finally, procedure management can help the operator to put corrective actions in
place or actually take corrective actions automatically. It can also prevent actions
from taking place if the initial set up is not correct for a start-up or transfer and so on.
The airline industry is amongst the safest and most automated in the world – in fact
most modern aircraft would not be able to fly without the use of computer guidance,
yet procedures play a big part in the way aircraft are operated. Pilots need to go
through many procedures before, during and after a flight.
The first recorded procedures were introduced by test pilots in 1935 [6] after a
crash of the B-17 Flying Fortress almost caused the program to be abandoned due to a
gust lock still being engaged at take-off. It was said that the plane was too
complicated to fly. The test pilots developed procedures for take-off, flight, before
landing and after landing. Boeing delivered 12 of the aircraft to the Air Corps and
they flew 1.8 million miles without a serious mishap. Every type of plane from small
private planes to the largest jumbo jet now uses procedures for all aspects of the
journey and not following them could lead to a pilot losing his license to fly (or
worse).
In the same way the start-up and shutdown of a process requires standard operating
procedures (SOPs) which are designed to ensure the process is started up or shut
down the same way each time. However, these are sometimes ‘modified’ by
experienced operators who may see a better way of doing things. In the case of both
the pilot and the process operator, there are ways that these improved procedures
should be evaluated and turned into current practices. In the case of an aircraft, the
consequences of not doing this are obvious, but in a process plant, a tweak here and a
tweak there may go unnoticed until things go wrong. As with the operation and
maintenance of aircraft, the goal of operations and decision support is to capture the
knowledge of the best and hopefully calmest operator on his/her best day under all
conditions.
Figure 5, below, depicts the methodology for capturing best practices procedures.
The goal of this approach is to “distil” best operating practices and find the right
balance between manual, prompted and automated procedures, documenting and
implementing the procedures and then executing continuous improvement cycles on
them. Automating every procedure does not always provide the best solution; neither
does manually executing every procedure. What does provide the best solution is to
consciously examine events that caused production interruptions, then examine the
procedure operations associated with those events, document them and determine
what type of implementation will provide the best economic return while improving
safety, health and the environmental metrics for the facility.

Fig. 5. Capturing Best Practices Procedures
A modular procedure consists of logical steps and as shown in Figure 5, each
operator has started with the same SOP but has modified it to handle different
situations and styles of operating by adding additional steps. On the right-hand side is
the resultant “best-practice” procedure.

7 Texaco Refinery, Milford Haven Revisited
Now let’s revisit the Texaco Milford Haven refinery incident. In terms of a set of
circumstances where the system could have potentially provided the operators with
the correct information at the right time and possibly even taken corrective actions,
this was a ‘perfect storm’.
Texaco had a DCS, but while the technology didn’t exist at that time to provide the
kind of highly optimised HMIs that we have today, many things could have been done
to reduce the operator mental workload and possibly have avoided the incident.
Alarm management could have reduced the number of high priority alarms so that
those that activated were timely and did not overload the operator and if many
activated at the same time, the system could have identified the possible ‘main actor’
enabling the operator to take action, or even taking action itself. For instance, the flare
drum high alarm that was missed could have triggered a procedure.
These days we have better historians and data analysis tools, able to identify
incidents as they start to occur and we can use intelligent displays to help the operator
to see where the main activities need to take place.
Procedures should have been followed and the incident report recommended
improved training and document keeping. But again today, a procedural assistant
could give clear communications regarding;
•
What was transpiring as the incident unfolded
•
Next steps according to approved safety procedures
•
Safety hazards associated with missteps

The incident report cited the inability of the operators to be able to carry out mass and
volume balances. A procedure assistant could have helped with this and triggered
actions or prompts as a result of an imbalance.

8 Can Standards Based Decision Support Help Mental Workload
in a Crisis?
In the human factors section of the Texaco Milford Haven refinery incident report,
one of the key factors mentioned was that the preparation of shift operators and
supervisors for dealing with a sustained 'upset', and therefore stressful, situation was
inadequate and that better overview facilities should have been provided.
This paper has shown that issues often exist with humans in the workplace during
times of crisis and stress. In some cases having the right human (or humans) in the
right place can be beneficial – and often this is the case. But we need to be prepared
for the situations where the operator gets overloaded, takes things for granted or an
inexperienced operator is working at the time things start to become unstable.
In times of abnormal operations, systems are configured to produce lots of data –
humans are not configured to handle or interpret it. However, when presented with the
right information, in the right context, during an abnormal condition, humans are able
to do things machines cannot. They can evaluate the situation and provide the
“thought process” on what action to take, with the guidance and support of automated
systems.
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